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FEDERAL COURTS & 
FEDERAL RIGHTS 
COMMENTARY 
Gordon Gregory Young::: 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In its 1977 decision in Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational ancl 
Health Review Commission, 1 the Supreme Court stated that the 
seventh amendment right to a jury trial2 generally was inapplicable 
in administrative proceedings. More recently, the Court in 
Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore,3 affirming the decision of the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 4 found no 
violation of the seventh amendment by the application of the doc-
trine of collateral estoppel and thus determined that findings made 
in an administrative enforcement proceeding could later be used 
preclusively by a different party in a private legal action. 5 
This Commentary asserts that the Atlas Court interpreted the 
seventh amendment without attempting to deal adequately with the 
text of that provision in light of its history, instead choosing to base 
its decision upon earlier Supreme Court cases themselves devoid of 
adequate historical analysis. 6 The Shore Court, while deciding 
against the claimed seventh amendment protection, arguably un-
dertook an analysis that is an improvement over that in .>\.tlas. The 
Shore majority did not deal in detail with historical materials, 
relying, as did the Atlas Court, on earlier Supreme Court cases. 
The Shore majority, however, unlike Atlas, relied on an earlier 
opinion that had grappled with relevant historical arguments, and 
*Associate Professor of Law, Syracuse University College of L;lw; J.D., New 
York University School of Law; LL.M. Harvard University Law School. 
1 430 u.s. 442 (1977). 
2 U.S. CONST. amend. VII. For the text of the seventh amendment. see tl'xt ac-
companying note 38 supra. 
3 99 S. Ct. 644 (1979). 
4 565 F.2d 815 (2d Cir. 1977), affd, 99 S. Ct. 644 (1979) •. 
5 See text and accompanying notes 84-117 infra. 
6 See text accompanying notes 45-59 infra. 
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thus may have provided the historical basis, which is indispensable 
to justify its result. 7 
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The Atlas decision remains disturbing, notwithstanding the 
opinion in Shore. The Shore decision arguably involved merely the 
notion of the seventh amendment's flexibility with respect to 
changes in " 'procedural incidents or details of jury trial.' "8 In con-
trast, the Atlas Court, in its rationale if not its holding, addressed 
the vastly more important issue of congressional power to eliminate 
jury trials in a given category of civil cases by simply re-
characterizing them as administrative proceedings. 9 
While I am disturbed by the Atlas Court's conclusions as to 
the scope of the seventh amendment, I do not criticize these con-
clusions, but rather, the process of constitutional analysis by which 
the Court arrived at them. What follows then is not a substantive 
evaluation of the seventh amendment issues raised in Atlas and 
Shore. 10 Nor is it an attempt to describe and criticize the Supreme 
Court's analyses in a wide variety of constitutional contexts. It is, 
rather, a portion of the latter task: it is a criticism of the Court's 
decisionmaking process in one important case dealing with a provi-
sion of the Bill of Rights. My argument is that the analytical pro-
7 See text accompanying notes 109-17 infra. 
8 99 S. Ct. at 654 (quoting Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 390 (1942)). 
9 See text accompanying notes 67-75 infra. 
10 One interesting analysis of the issue raised in Atlas was published in response 
to the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in tlw 
companion case to Atlas, Frank lrey, Jr., Inc. v. Occupational Safety and Health Re-
view Comm'n, 519 F.2d 1215 (3d Cir. 1975), aff'd, 430 U.S. 442 (1977). See Note, 
Constitutional Law-Adminstrative Adjudications Resulting in the Imposition of a 
Statutory Money Penalty Constitute a Class of Actions to Which the Se01.mth 
Amendment Does Not Apply, 7 SETON HALL L. REV. 458 (1976) (rejecting the posi· 
tion ultimately taken by the Supreme Court). The strong textual-oriented seventh 
amendment analysis made in that Note was available to, but ignored by, the Supremo 
Court in Atlas. 
The issue in Shore similarly had been discussed in one law review article prior 
to the Supreme Court's decision in that case. See Shapiro & Coquillette, The Ft1tish 
of jury Trial in Civil Cases: A Comment on Rachal v. Hill, 85 HARV. L. REV. 442 
(1971). 
It is not my purpose to present original historical scholarship dealing with tho 
purpose of the seventh amendment or to attempt to show merely the internal incon· 
sistency of the Supreme Court's seventh amendment decisions. These tasks have 
been performed admirably elsewhere. See, e.g., Henderson, The Background of the 
Seventh Amendment, 80 HARV. L. REv. 289 (1966); Wolfram, The Constitutional 
History of the Seventh Amendment, 51 MINN. L. REv. 639, 640 (1973). See also 
Redish, Seventh Amendment Right to junJ Trial: A Study in the Irrationality of Ra· 
tional Decision Making, 10 N.W. L. REV. 486 (1975) (arguing persuasively that the 
Supreme Court's seventh amendment decisions are not based on a carefully rea-
soned and consistently applied theory of that amendment). I will draw on such mate· 
rials to illustrate the points I wish to make. 
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cess employed in Atlas to define the seventh amendment jury trial 
right deviates substantially from the dictates of the public notion of 
"judicial morality," i.e., that which lawyers in our tradition e:-.:pect 
from the Supreme Court. 
II. TAKING SEVENTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 
This section is divided into three parts: Part A offers a brief 
discussion of the importance to constitutional analysis of identifying 
the precepts of a widely shared morality concerning how judges 
ought to deal with the text of the Constitution; Part B identifies 
and examines perhaps the most basic of such precepts-that histor-
ical analysis of the purpose of a particular constitutional provision is 
the correct threshold inquiry in constitutional cases, because we 
currently consider the Constitution to be a document written to 
bind future generations; Part C then examines the Atlas case for 
signs that the Supreme Court took seriously its institutional re-
sponsibility to attempt a historical-purposive analysis of the seventh 
amendment. 
A. The Notion of judicial Morality and Its Relationship 
to the Notion of Rights 
The discussion of legal rights is frequently confused by shifts 
between descriptive and normative points of view and by the intri-
cate ways in which such viewpoints are mutually dependent. From 
the narrowest descriptive point of view, a right exists when the 
highest court that will decide a matter declares it to e:dst. It is, 
however, commonplace to observe that such a narrow descriptive 
view does not help a judge decide a case. Thus, in order to reach a 
decision, he or she will not ask the circular question, "What will 
my decision be?" but rather, "How ought this case be decided 
under the rules and other authoritative materials of this legal sys-
tem?" It is the latter question that recognizes that the judicial de-
cisionmaking process is subject to public ex-pectations: when law-
yers, and any lay persons who seriously engage in legal argument, 
criticize a judge for having erred in deciding the rights of the par-
ties, such criticism can be based only upon some independent no-
tion of how judges ought to decide. 
To the extent that there is widely shared agreement among 
lawyers about how judges ought to proceed in deciding cases, that 
agreement defines a public-morality or normative perspective from 
which the action of courts can be criticized. An example of an at-
tempt to define such a critical-moral perspective is Professor 
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Ronald Dworkin's book, Taking Rights Seriously. 11 
Dworkin focuses on "hard cases," those in which recognized 
clear rules demand no one result. 12 He rejects the quite ordinary 
assertion that judges simply exercise discretion in such cases, 
arguing that our shared notion of what judges ought to do in such 
circumstances is too complex and subtle to be characterized as 
permitting pure discretion. 13 There are principles that are recog-
nized parts of our legal system. 14 Unlike rules, principles compel 
no particular result, but rather are analogous to vector arrows 
pointing at results. 15 Sometimes principles which are indisputably 
applicable to a single case will nevertheless point at differing re-
sults; it is then that the relative force of each principle must be de-
termined.16 To the extent there is no authoritative view on the rel-
ative weight to be accorded to principles, judges must make 
personal value judgments. 17 They must, however, be sure that 
they have exhausted authoritative material first, and they must ap-
ply their values carefully and consistently. 18 
Dworkin implies that lawyers tacitly understand that judges 
11 R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 105-15 (1977). Dworkin suggests that 
judicial morality requires that judges adhere to those rules that are acknowledged 
parts of the legal system. These are to be found in either written constitutions, ld. at 
106, validly enacted constitutional statutes, id. at 107, or the common law of the Ju· 
risdiction within which the judge sits, id. at 108. Where any or all of these rules arc 
applicable to a particular case, no judge may simply choose to ignore them. Rather, 
he is compelled to grapple with the dictates of the legislative and common law pre· 
cedents, notwithstanding that determining just how to do so may be difficult, and 
there may be disagreement among responsible judges as to the proper approach. 
Dworkin indicates that there is a limit to the sweep of even "settled" authorlta· 
tive materials. That is, Dworkin argues that where authoritative materials compt•l no 
particular result a judge must formulate and rely upon his own theory of law to de· 
cide matters which are the subject of legitimate disagreement among judges. Icl. at 
105-15. 
12 I d. at 81. 
13 I d. at 31-39, 68-71. 
14 I d. at 22-24. 
15 I d. at 22-28. The analogy is valid to a point. As with vectors, the result of tlw 
application of a principle cannot be predicted without knowledge of the other forces 
(in my metaphor, other principles) bearing on the outcome. Id. at 26. According to 
Dworkin, different judges, however, legitimately may assign a different force to a 
particular principle. I d. at 36. In contrast, in the world of physics each force prcsum· 
ably has an objective value. 
16 I d. at 35-36. 
17 See note 11 and accompanying text supra. 
18 I d. The judge's own values are to be applied only after authoritative material 
has been exhausted, and then, only to develop the concepts that arc authoritatively 
parts of the system but the content of which is disputed. I d. See R. DWORKIN, suprll 
note 11, at 107, 123-30. 
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ought to behave in this manner. For example, it is the prevailing 
view of judicial morality that judges ought to consider publicly rec-
ognized principles, even though no authoritative written rule re-
quires that they do so. 19 A judge therefore errs when he fails to 
follow the real, although uncodified, rule that such principles must 
be consulted. If his failure affects the outcome of the case, he has 
established rights from a descriptive point of view, but denied 
them from a public normative perspective. 20 
I agree with that which Dworkin implies-that the notion of 
legal rights, in a publicly recognized sense, is dependent upon a 
shared perspective of how judges ought to decide cases. Courts 
take rights seriously in Dworkin's sense only when they adhere to 
the uncodified but real rules defining their institutional responsibil-
ity. In Part B, I hope to identify a precept of our prevailing view of 
judicial morality less controversial than those upon which Dworldn 
focuses and then to examine the Supreme Court's opinion in litlas 
to determine whether the Court adhered to that precept. 
B. judicial Morality and Constitutional Rights 
There seems to be agreement among lawyers that the Consti-
tution is binding law. Such assertion standing alone, however, is 
not particularly helpful. The physical Constitution is simply cold 
text, an arrangement of symbols. The meaning of any such arrange-
ment of symbols lies solely in its use in a community of speak-
ers. 21 This Constitution then, has no meaning apart from our un-
derstanding of how its text is to be used in making legal decisions. 
It is not the physical Constitution itself which requires us to 
use its text in a particular way; nor can it be merely the intent of 
the long dead framers of the document which controls. It is, 
rather, simply the current understanding among lawyers that the 
document ought to be used in a particular way. 22 
Currently, the virtually unanimous view of judicial morality as 
it pertains to constitutional decisionmaking is that tl1e Constitution 
1s R. DwoRKIN, supra note 11, at 123-26. 
20 I d. at 279-80. 
21 This is perhaps the most important lesson of Wittgenstein's later philosophy. 
L. WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 20 (3d ed. G. Anscombe trans. 
1958). See also A. KE!I.'NY, WITTGENSTEIN 155 (1973). 
22 Of course, in some immediate, coercive sense, no final decisionmaker, i.e., one 
whose judgment will not be reviewed by a higher authority, is required to act in any 
particular way. It is recognized, however, that in a normative sense a judge is re-
quired by prevailing notions of his institutional responsibility to behave in certain 
ways. See note 11 and accompanying text supra. 
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ought to be treated as setting forth rules binding upon future gen-
erations. 23 Thus, the present view of judicial morality recognizes 
that the Bill of Rights is designed to fix individual rights so that 
they can stand against majority action24 and can be changed only 
by means of a process itself specified in a binding way. 25 
If the current bedrock principle of judicial morality requires 
the Constitution to be treated as a set of rules written in the past 
to bind the future, then it follows that the threshold inquiry in 
constitutional cases necessarily must be historical in nature. This 
does not mean that historical inquiries will be made explicitly in 
every case or that where made they will consume the most 
decisionmaking time. It does mean, however, that courts of the 
United States have a recognized obligation to deal with the Consti-
tution as open to change only where the document itself provides 
for it. 
Certain constitutional provisions may indeed provide for 
change. Dworkin, for example, deals admirably with loosely-woven 
provisions such as the fourteenth amendment's due process clause, 
arguing plausibly that the amendment itself is best understood as 
an invitation to future generations to apply their own standards of 
fairness. 26 There is every reason to impute to the framers the un-
derstanding that the document was to be deemed flexible where its 
text reasonably suggests flexibility. 27 
23 This proposition, which implies the primacy of historical analysis, is based 
upon my own observations. There are, however, certainly some who seem to dis-
agree. 2 CORWIN, AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW 290 (1925), reprinted In 
E. CORWIN, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 108 (1964) ("The proper point of 
view ... is that of regarding [the constitution] as a living statute, palpitating with the 
purpose of the hour, reenacted with every waking breath of the American people 
.... "). See also Munzer & Nickel, Does the Constitution Mean What It Always 
Meant?, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1029 (1977). 
24 See R. DWORKIN, supra note 11, at 133. 
25 See U.S. CaNST. art. V. Article V provides, in relevant part: 
The Congress, whenever, two thirds of both Houses shall deem it nee· 
essary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or on the Application 
of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention 
for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all In· 
tents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legis· 
latures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three 
fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be pro· 
posed by the Congress .... 
2s R. DWORKIN, supra note 11, at 131-37. 
27 I d. It is no novel assertion that the concept of a constitution itself may suggest 
reading flexibly those portions fairly susceptible to such a reading. This is the fair 
purport of Justice John Marshall's statement, "[W]e must never forget it is a coli· 
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Unfortunately, so large a part of the body of modern American 
constitutional case law has dealt with such loosely-woven provi-
sions28 that the interest-balancing analysis invited by them may 
have come to seem synonymous with constitutional analysis gener-
ally. 29 It is easy, then, for courts to lose sight of the fact that such 
balancing is improper, under prevailing standards of judicial moral-
ity, where the Constitution, as read in historical context, cannot 
fairly be understood as authorizing it. 
An example may prove helpful. How should a court deal with 
a clear and specific constitutional provision such as the one that 
fixes the minimum age for presidents at thirty-five years?30 No one 
would suggest that a court, believing that persons were currently 
maturing earlier or later than in 1791, could read thirty-five as 
thirty or forty, respectively. A court would not have this freedom 
even if, at the time, age was no longer generally reckoned in years 
but in some other unit of time. The reason is, of course, that if the 
Constitution is a binding document, such a provision, read in his-
torical context, permits no such flexibility. Thus, if still considered 
binding by the legal system then prevailing, the Constitution 
would require the conversion of a candidate's age into years as that 
term was understood in 1791. 
The seventh amendment's command is equally unequivocal as 
applicable to categories of actions that were recognized in 1791.31 
What is unclear, however, is its application to the categories recog-
nized in the twentieth century that differ from those of the earlier 
time. If the Constitution is binding, the threshold inquiry must be, 
"What flexibility was envisioned for the seventh amendment when 
it was drafted?" 
stitution we are e:\.-pounding." McCulloch v. ~faryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 
(1819) (emphasis in original). 
28 Raoul Berger states that the "Fourteenth Amendment is probabl)• the largest 
source of a court's business," R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY jUDICIARY 1 (1977) 
(citing Frankfurter, john Marshall and the judicial Function, 69 HAn\'. L. RE\'. 217, 
229 (1955)), and suggests that the Supreme Court has read its own values into that 
amendment. I do not agree with all of Professor Berger's criticisms of a \'alue judg-
ment approach as it may be applied to loosely-woven constitutional provisions such 
as the fourteenth amendment. 
29 It is my thesis that the Supreme Court may well ha\'e adopted such an ap-
proach in Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Healtl1 Review Comm'n, 430 
U.S. 422 (1977). The Supreme Court there offered no adequate reason for its seem-
ingly flexible interpretation of the seventh amendment. For a full discussion, see text 
accompanying notes 32-82 infra. 
30 U.S. CONST. art II, § 1, cl. 4. 
3 1 See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 193 (1974). 
HeinOnline -- 45 Brook. L. Rev. 1152 1978-1979
1152 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW (Vol. 45: 1145 
C. Atlas and its Foundation 
In Atlas, 32 the Supreme Court upheld against a seventh 
amendment challenge agency enforcement procedures that pro-
vided for a civil money penalty. The Occupational Safety and 
Health Act of 197()33 provided that factual determinations of the 
Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (the Commis-
sion) were binding upon a reviewing court if supported by substan-
tial evidence34 and hence, it precluded a trial in court to deter-
mine the existence of violations and the propriety of civil penalties 
imposed. 35 The Atlas petitioners were found by the Commission to 
have violated certain safety standards of the Act and, as a conse-
quence, abatement orders were issued and civil money penalties 
were imposed. 36 Upon review, the Supreme Court upheld the pro-
cedures of the Commission, rejecting petitioners' contention that 
the statutory scheme denied them their right to a trial by jury as 
guaranteed by the seventh amendment, 37 which provides: 
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall ex-
ceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, 
and no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise reexamined in any 
Court of the United States, than according to the rules of com-
mon law.38 
The announced rationale39 for Atlas is essentially that when-
ever Congress creates a new cause of action, regardless of its reme-
dial characteristics, it can avoid jury trial rights by providing for 
32 430 U.S. 442 (1977). In the same opinion the Atlas Court decided Frank lwy, 
Jr., Inc. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442 (1977). 
33 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-671 (1976). 
34 I d. § 660(a). 
35 See 430 U.S. at 447. 
36 See id. Petitioners, following the review procedures of the Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 
659-661, (1976), unsuccessfully contested the orders and penalties. See 430 U.S. at 
447-48. 
37 Petitioners argued that a suit in federal court for the imposition of a civil pen· 
alty was a suit for a money judgment, a legal action, and therefore acquired a right to 
a jury trial. See id. at 449. Petitioners argued further that Congress could not nbro-
gate that right by assigning to an agency the power to determine the governnwnt's 
right to a civil penalty. See id. at 450. 
38 U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
39 There is a possible argument, based upon the understanding of the framNS of 
the Bill of Rights that, if the Court had so chosen, Atlas could have been decided on 
the ground that no matter the nature of the forum, suits by the federal governml'nt 
are triable without a jury. The argument, however, has been dismissed as wenk. S!'l' 
Note, supra note 10 at 477-81. 
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agency adjudication. 40 The Atlas Court concluded from prior cases 
that when Congress creates "new statutory 'public rights' " it may 
provide, consistently with the seventh amendment, that an adminis-
trative agency will be charged with adjudicating those rights. 41 The 
Court reasoned, in part: 
Congress is not required by the Seventh Amendment to choke 
the already crowded federal courts with new types of litigation 
nor prevented from committing some new types of litigation to 
administrative agencies with special competence in the field. 
This is the case even if the Seventh Amendment would have re-
quired a jury where the adjudication of those rights is assigned 
instead to a federal court of law instead of an administrative 
agency.42 
Clearly, the Atlas Court's suggestion that such congressional 
power is confined to public rights is not meaningful unless it is 
construed to mean that the power is confined to any regulation of 
private conduct that affects the public interest. This construction is 
supported by the Atlas Court's characterization of an earlier case, 
which also permitted agency instead of jury factfinding, as within 
the sweep of that congressional power over "public rights." That 
case, NLRB v. jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,43 involved an admin-
istrative right to recover back pay, which Congress used to sup-
plant analogous contract rights enforceable at common law.44 
The Atlas Court, however, failed to offer an adequate justifica-
tion for its interpretation of the seventh amendment, either in 
1 terms of precedent or the language and history of the amendment. 
This lack of reasoned justification is evidence of what I believe to 
be the Court's failure to take seventh amendment rights seriously. 
40 430 U.S. at 455. The Court's announcement is particularly interesting in light 
of its holding in Curtis v. Loether, 415 U. S. 189, 193-95 (1974). There, the jury right 
was asserted in a private action authorized by § 812 of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 
42 U.S.C. § 3612 (1976). The Court held that if Congress creates a new pri\oate cause 
of action that is to proceed in federal court and "involves rights and remedies of the 
sort typically enforced in an action at law," the right to a jury trial attaches. 415 U.S. 
at 195. Thus the Curtis Court apparently considered to be relevant both the forum to 
which the litigants were assigned and the resemblance of the statutorily created 
cause of action to an action at common law. 
41 430 U.S. at 455 (emphasis added). 
42 I d. at 453-54. 
43 301 u.s. 1 (1937). 
44 Prior to the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 tl976), an em-
ployee's suit to recover for wrongful dismissal under a contract of emplo)ment 
would have been a suit at common law. For a further discussion of )ones i.~ 
Laughlin, see text accompanying notes 46-53 infra. 
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(1) Precedential justification for the Atlas Interpretation of 
the Seventh Amendment. To begin with precedent, jones & 
Laughlin is arguably one of only two cases in which the Supreme 
Court dealt explicitly with, and denied the existence of, the right 
to a trial by jury in an administrative proceeding.45 In jones & 
Laughlin the respondent argued that an order to pay back wages 
was synonymous with a money judgment and that consequently in 
a proceeding seeking such relief, it must be accorded the right to a 
jury trial. The Court rejected that argument, observing that the 
seventh amendment "perserves" the right to a jury trial as that 
right was recognized at common law when the amendment was 
adopted. 46 Accordingly, the amendment "has no application to 
cases where recovery of money damages is an incident to equitable 
relief even though damages might have been recovered in an ac-
tion at law. . . . It does not apply where the proceeding is not in 
the nature of a common law suit. "47 Determining then that the ac-
tion before it was neither one at common law nor one in the nature 
of such action, the Court concluded, "The proceeding is one un-
known to the common law. It is a statutory proceeding. Reinstate-
ment of the employee and payment for lost time are requirements 
imposed for the violation of the statute and are remedies appropri-
ate to its enforcement."4 S 
The Atlas Court seized upon the Court's "statutory" character-
ization of the proceeding, quoting in text that portion of the 
Court's statement and giving it emphasis. 49 The Atlas Court, how-
45 The Atlas Court itself noted, 430 U.S. at 456, that some of the cases upon 
which it relied did not expressly address the seventh amendment question: 
Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938); Lloyd Sabaudo Societa v. Elting, 287 
U.S. 329 (1932); Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589 (1931); Oceanic Nav. Co. v. 
Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320 (1909); Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land Co., 59 U.S. (18 
How.) 272 (1855). Notwithstanding, the Court considered that each did lnvolw 
nonjudicial factfinding and found it "difficult to believe that these holdings or dicta 
did not subsume the proposition that a jury trial was not required." 430 U.S. at 456. 
The Court did note further, however, that the other cases upon which It rl'iit'd 
expressly considered that administrative factfinding was not barred by tht' St'Venth 
amendment. Id.; Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363 (1974); Curtis v. Lot•tht'r, 
415 U.S. 189 (1974); Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135 (1921). However, two of the cases 
did so in dicta: in Pernell, the Court recognized the right to a jury trial when a judi· 
cia! forum is provided for disputes involving ·legal issues, and in Curtis, the right to a 
jury trial was found applicable to a statutorily created private damage action brought 
in federal court. For a discussion of the Block case, see text accompanying nott•s 
54-58 infra. 
46 301 U.S. at 48. 
47Jd. 
48 ld. at 48-49 (citations omitted). 
49 In discussing jones & Laughlin, the Atlas Court quoted: 
HeinOnline -- 45 Brook. L. Rev. 1155 1978-1979
1979) FEDERAL COURTS l.~ RIGHTS 1155 
ever, relegated to a footnote its observation that the Jones & 
Laughlin Court disposed of the constitutional claim "on the sepa-
rate grounds that the amendment is inapplicable where 'recovery 
of money damages is an incident to [nonlegal] relief.' "50 The Atlas 
Court took great pains to reject that alternative ex-planation of 
Jones & Laughlin in favor of one affirming congressional power to 
assign such supplanting actions to agency factfinding, stating: 
The Court also rejected the Seventh Amendment claim in Jones 
& Laughlin on the separate ground . . . [that] in such cases 
courts of equity would historically have granted monetary relief. 
In Jones & Laughlin, the NLRB ordered reinstatement of a dis-
missed employee, an order analogous to injunctive relief histor-
ically obtainable only in a court of equity, and consequently this 
alternative ground was an adequate one to decide Jones & 
Laughlin. However, this alternative ground would have been in-
sufficient to decide the more general question of the NLRB's 
power to order backpay where, for one reason or anotlter, no 
such equitable order was sought. 51 
The Jones & Laughlin Court, however, certainly seemed to 
have considered the equitable "clean-up" doctrine52 to be an ex-pla-
nation for finding the seventh amendment inapplicable. My argu-
"The instant case is not a suit at common law or in the nature of such 
suit. The proceeding is one unknown to the common law. It is a statutory 
proceeding. Reinstatement of the employee and payment for time lost are 
requirements [administratively] imposed for violation of tlJC statute and are 
remedies appropriate to its enforcement. The contention under the Seventh 
Amendment is without merit." 
430 U.S. at 453 (quoting NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. l, 48-49 
(1937)) (brackets and emphasis added by the Atlas Court). 
5o Id. at n.lO (quoting NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 48-49 
(1937)) (brackets added by the Atlas Court). 
51 Id. 
52 Traditionally, the equity "clean-up" doctrine allowed a court of equity, in cer-
tain circumstances, to dispose of an entire case, including any issues of a legal nature 
that might have been involved. See DOBBS, REMEDIES 84 (1973). For example, in 
Gulbenkian v. Gulbenkian, 147 F.2d 173, 176 (2d Cir. 1945), the court ruled that 
where plaintiff sought an injunction or specific performance and was entitled to 
money damages, the chancellor, in determining equitable issues, might also deter-
mine the legal issues. Thus, in a restricted number of cases, when the legal issue 
was viewed as "incidental" to the equitable claim, the latter overshadowed the 
former. See DOBBS, supra, at 84. The use of the "clean-up" doctrine to authorize an 
equity court to exercise jurisdiction over legal issues has retained little significance 
today, in part because of the ease with which equitable and legal claims may be 
joined and the existence of legal and equitable counterclaims. See RE, EQUITY M"D 
EQUITABLE PRINCIPLES 33 (1975). Cf. Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 
(1962) (holding that the jury trial right could not be lost when legal claims were 
joined with equitable claims). 
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ment with the Atlas Court's use of jones & Laughlin is not that the 
jones & Laughlin Court clearly did intend the equitable nature of 
such proceeding to be the sole ground for its decision. It is, rather, 
that the] ones & Laughlin Court, in the case before it, might have 
understood such reason to be the crucial factor, notwithstanding 
the Court's going beyond that statement. 53 The Atlas Court's com-
plete reliance on the portion of the Court's statement concerning 
the statutory nature of the proceeding does not seem wholly justifi-
able. Whatever the actual justification for the] ones & Laughlin de-
cision, however, the ultimate point here is that even a court that ex-
alts stare decisis over a reasoned and historically informed 
explication of the Constitution's text would not find]ones & Laugh-
lin to be tightly binding precedent; the lack of a fully reasoned 
analysis as well as the availability of multiple explanations makes 
difficult any firm reliance upon that case. 
Block v. Hirsh 54 is the second of the two precedents that dealt 
explicitly with the right to jury trials in administrative proceedings. 
The Block Court, indeed, was presented with the argument that an 
administrative scheme violated the seventh amendment because it 
consigned to an agency for factual determination questions in a 
landlord-tenant dispute concerning the right to possession of real 
property. 55 Although the Block Court offered little discussion of 
the seventh amendment issue, the opinion, finding no bar to the 
administrative scheme, 56 must be considered responsive to that ar-
gument. 
Block surely can be treated as precedent in favor of the Atlas 
Court's interpretation of the seventh amendment. Notwithstanding 
that an action to recover possession of property is a legal action, 57 
the Block Court held valid the procedure that denied a jury trial. 
Of course, there are ways in which an advocate would attempt to 
53 There are hvo possible justifications that may be offered for the jones & 
Laughlin Court's additional statements. First, the essential factor enabling the Court 
legitimately to characterize the proceeding as "statutory" may have been that the 
proceeding did not supplant a common law suit but only an equitable one. Howevt•r, 
a second explantation, considered either as dictum or an alternative holding, I admit 
is more plausible, see note 49 infra; the Court may have considered that the statu· 
tory character of the proceeding was alone sufficient to find that no jury trial right 
existed. 
54 256 u.s. 135 (1921). 
55 It is not clear from the reported case that the seventh amendment argument 
was made, but that point was briefed to the Court. Brief for Defendant In Error at 4, 
19-21, Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135 (1921). 
56 256 U.S. at 158. 
57 Whitehead v. Shattuck, 138 U.S. 146, 151 (1891). 
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blunt the force of the decision. For example, the legislation chal-
lenged in Block was an emergency measure enacted to fight the se-
vere housing shortage generated by war58 and thus, the holding 
plausibly could be limited to the war emergency context. Never-
theless, I think it must be treated as supporting precedent. 
It is important to note, however, that neither Block nor jones 
& Laughlin contained reasoned analysis of the seventh amend-
ment's application to administrative proceedings. Both ] ones L-
Laughlin and Block merely offer unsupported conclusions about 
the effect of the seventh amendment without any apparent attempt 
to examine the language of that provision in its historical context. 
Indeed, in neither ]ones & Laughlin nor Block did the Court have 
sophisticated briefs dealing with the seventh amendment argu-
ment. In each case, to the extent that the argument was made at 
all, it appeared almost as an afterthought. 59 It was not until three 
decades later, in Atlas, that the Court had before it both the iso-
lated issue of the application of the amendment to administrative 
actions60 and thoughtful briefs dealing with the amendment in its 
historical context.61 Unfortunately, the Supreme Court, which has 
asserted that stare decisis has less force in the constitutional con-
text than in others, 62 chose to support its explication of the seventh 
amendment upon a case law foundation either wanting in reasoned 
analysis or inconclusive as to the grounds supporting it. 
Although there were no dissents in Atlas, in its companion 
case, Frank Irey, Jr.; Inc. v. Occupational Safety ancl Health Com-
mission, 63 a dissent was registered in the United States Court of 
58 256 U.S. at 155-56. 
59 The arguments on the general applicability of the seventh amendmcmt to the 
administrative proceedings were conclusory. Sec, e.g., Brief for Defendant in Error at 
19-21, Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135 (1921); Brief for Respondent at 99-105, NLRB \'. 
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). 
so Both Block and jones & Laughlin were complex cases presenting substantial 
issues along with the seventh amendment issue: in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel 
Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 22-44 (1937), the Court considered the validity of regulatory pro-
grams under the commerce clause, and in Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 153-SS 
(1921), the Court considered the legitimacy of the use of police powers in an emer-
gency context. A fair reading of the briefs and opinions in each cas!.' indicates that in 
both the amendment issue occupied a small portion of the enl•rgies of the Court and 
advocates. 
6 1 See note 79 and accompanying text infra. 
62 See, e.g., Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 6.58, 695 (1978) 
("[W]e have stated that stare decisis has more force in statutory analysis than in con-
stitutional adjudication because, in the former situation, Congress l'Un 1.-orrect our 
mistakes through legislation .... ") (citation omitted). 
63 519 F.2d 1200 (3d Cir. 1974), aff'd on rcllcaring, 519 F.2d 1215 (3d Cir. 1975), 
aff d, 430 U.S. 442 (1977). 
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Appeals for the Third Circuit by Judge Gibbons. 64 Judge Gibbons, 
discussing the position adopted by the court of appeals' majority, 
and that ultimately taken by the Supreme Court, argued that the 
result effectively gave Congress the power to define and limit the 
reach of the seventh amendment. Judge Gibbons disagreed that 
the conclusion was supported by precedent, stating: 
If this is the teaching of the one authority upon which the 
majority relies, then unbeknownst to the world of legal scholar-
ship, NLRB v. jones & Laughlin Steel Corp . ... [effected] the 
most profound and enormous redistribution of power among the 
three branches of the federal government of any case in the 
Court's history .... [I]f Congress can by fiat define the term 
"administrative adjudication" and thereby necessarily define the 
seventh amendment term "Suits at common law," what role do 
the article III courts play? ... [M)y point is that ... the consti-
tutional scheme of things requires that the Court, not Congress, 
give meaning to the Constitutional terms, and thereby define 
the limits of administrative proceedings. 65 
In light of their thin analytical underpinnings, neither jones & 
Laughlin nor Block seem compelling as precedents. 66 An examina-
tion of Atlas for signs of constitutional analysis which deals directly 
with the meaning of the seventh amendment in its historical con-
text yields equally unsatisfactory results. 
(2) Textual and Historical justification for the Atlas Interpre-
tation of the Seventh Amendment. While the Atlas position may ul-
timately prove to be justified by an historical-purposive analysis, it 
is difficult to discern such justification from the opinion by the 
Court. Surely, before it avoided the plausible, narrow justifications 
for nonjury trials supplied by both Block and jones & Laughlin, 
and before it recognized a sweeping congressional power, the Atlas 
Court was obligated to offer an adequately documented and rea-
soned analysis of the seventh amendment's text as understood in its 
historical context. 67 The Court provided almost none, however. 08 
64Jd. at 1207, 1219. 
65 ld. at 1221-22 (citation omitted). 
66 Additionally, courts do have the power to and do occasionally overrule a case 
on the ground that it was wrongly decided. See Monell v. Department of Social 
Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (overruling portion of Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 
(1961)). 
67 See text accompanying notes 21-31 supra. 
68 The Court does provide a brief glimpse of some of the history of the amend· 
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Instead, the Court offered a series of ipse dixits, demonstrative of 
the Court's position yet unenlightening as to its rationale. 
The Court stated that the seventh amendment was merely 
«declaratory of the existing law" since it mandated only that a trial 
by jury ·\vas to be ·preserved'"; hence the amendment "did not 
purport to require a jury trial where none was required before. "69 
Additionally, the amendment attempted neither to alter the meth-
ods of determining facts in actions traditionally tried without a 
jury,70 nor to ··freeze equity jurisdiction" as it was in 1789.71 The 
Court then emphasized that «the Seventh Amendment was never 
intended to establish the jury as the exclusive mechanism for 
factfinding in civil cases,"72 and concluded: 
[The seventh amendment] took the existing legal order as it 
found it, and there is little or no basis for concluding that the 
Amendment should now be interpreted to provide an impenetra-
ble barrier to administrative factfinding under othenvise valid 
federal regulatory statutes. We cannot conclude that the Amend-
ment rendered Congress powerless . . . to create new public 
rights and remedies by statute and commit their enforcement, if 
it chose to, to a tribunal other than a court of law-such as an 
administrative agency-in which facts are not found by 
• • 73 JUnes .... 
The Atlas Court addressed the very real concern that its deci-
sion would permit Congress to nullify the jury trial right since 
Congress could freely assign to an administrative forum those 
disputes concerning matters heretofore adjudicated in a judicial fo-
rum. The Court responded to that concern, not with reasons for 
the existence of the congressional power asserted, but with a prom-
ise that some limit exists: 
The argument is well put, but it overstates the holdings of our 
prior cases and is in any event unpersuasive. Our prior cases 
support administrative factfinding in only those situations in-
volving "public rights," .e.g., where the Government is involved 
ment, 430 U.S. at 459-60, but does so from the perspective of cases dealing with the 
issue tangentially or in other contexts. 
69 Id. at 459. 
7o I d. 
71 I d. 
72 Id. at 460. 
73 Id. 
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in its sovereign capacity under an otherwise valid statute 
creating enforceable public rights. Wholly private tort, contract, 
property and a vast range of other cases as well are not at all im-
plicated. 74 
The articulated limit to congressional power, i.e., the "public 
rights" concept, seems coextensive with the federal government's 
power to create agencies to regulate matters designated to be of 
national concern. Consequently, it is arguable that the limit exists 
only after congressional action has rendered it meaningless to a liti-
gant.75 
If the Court were not constrained by the Constitution, but 
were instead free to base its decisions upon the Justices' notions of 
prudence, the Court perhaps could determine plausibly that jury 
trials are either undesirable or desirable in federal civil actions and 
apply the seventh admendment accordingly. The Court, however, 
is considered bound by the Constitution. 76 This entails, under the 
prevailing standards of judicial morality, that the Court is expected 
to render its constitutional interpretations in the light of the fram-
ers' purposes. 77 
(3) Analysis Not Undertaken and Important Arguments Not 
Answered By the Court in Atlas. The Atlas petitioners, using lan-
guage from an earlier Supreme Court opinion and citing to other 
historical materials, urged a position that seems compelling on the 
surface at least: " 'In a just sense, the Amendment then may well 
be construed to embrace all suits which are not of equity and ad-
miralty jurisdiction, whatever may be the peculiar form which they 
may assume to settle legal rights.' "78 There is a strong argument, 
based upon historical materials, that the words "common law" as 
used in the seventh amendment were indeed intended to deflne a 
74 I d. at 458. 
75 It might be argued, for example, that once Congress has determined to plact• a 
matter in the hands of an agency for resolution, the "national interest" label would 
attach and hence, Congress will be deemed to have exercised its power within the 
limitation defined. 
76 See text accompanying notes 21-31 supra. 
77 See id. 
78 Brief for Petitioners at 24, Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health 
Review Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442 (1977) (quoting Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 
443, 446 (1830) (emphasis by Petitioners deleted, emphasis added). 
Judge Gibbons proposed this argument in his dissent in frey. 519 F.2d at 
1207-15; see also Note, supra note 10, wherein the position is stated forcefully. Tlw 
argument was not answered by the Court in Atlas save in a conclusory mnnnt•r, S!'l' 
text accompanying notes 73-77 supra. 
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catch-all category for all proceedings other than those which by his-
torical accident were triable solely to a judge. 79 
The Atlas Court had available to it materials with which to 
shape a meaningful response to petitioners' argument. 80 However, 
the Court did not reveal whether it considered the historical mate-
rials and resolved that the materials {1) were clearly in favor of the 
nonapplication of the seventh amendment to administrative pro-
ceedings, or (2) were inconclusive, thereby permitting the consid-
eration of such factors as efficiency in the decisionmaking process. 
A court that takes seriously its obligation to deal with an im-
portant application of a guarantee of individual rights has a duty, at 
the very least, to offer an account of its struggle with historical ma-
terials. 81 The Supreme Court failed to fulfill that duty in l1tlas. I 
would urge, therefore, that the far-reaching statements in Atlas be 
reconsidered at the next available opportunity. The historical argu-
ments must be answered or, if they remain unanswered after refer-
ence to available material, the Court must so declare and ex-plain 
why it should indulge in a presumption against the plausible inter-
pretation of the seventh amendment, which yields protection un-
der a .. catch-all" definition of .. common law. "82 
79 In the brief to the Atlas Court, the petitioners cited the following authorities: 
Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73; An Act for the Ease of the Subject, 21 
James 1, ch. 4; Act of March 3, 1803; Leg. History Note, 1948, 28 U.S.C. § 1783, at 
7623 (1970 ed.); American Act, 4 Geo. 3, ch. 151; Declaration of Independence; 12 
THmL\S }EFFERSON PAPERS (Princeton Univ. Press 1950); 2 WORKS OF ~IADISO:S, 
183 (1900); 1-2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CO:SSTlTUTIO:S OF THE U:SlTED 
STATES (1833); l. ESPINARSE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF AC"riO:S O:S PE...,AL 
STATUTES 5 (1813); FEDERAL PAPERS, No. 83 (The New American Library of World 
Literature, 1961 ed.); l.W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF E:SGUSH LAw; PLUK:sETT, 
A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW (5th eel.); 2 LEGAL PAPERS OF }om.; 
ADAMS (A.L. Wroth & H. Zibot, eds. 1965); Henderson, The Background of the Scc-
enth Amendment, 80 HARv. L. REv. 289 (1967). Brief for the Petitioners at \•i·\'il, 
Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442 
(1977). 
Respondents' brief cited 34 separate documents, including correspondence of 
the framers, proposed amendments to the Bill of Rights and state constitutions and 
declarations of rights. Among those authorities cited and not included in the list of 
sources cited by petitioner were: 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS (1789); BIOGI\APIUCAL 
DIC"riONARY OF THE AMERICAN CONGRESS, 1774-1971 (G.P.O. 1971); ~L\L'-:, THE 
.ANTIFEDERALISTS (1961); A.T. MASON, THE STATES RIGHTS DEBATE: A.''TlFEDER· 
ALISM AND THE CONSTITUTION (1964); SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCU· 
lliENTARY HISTORY (1971). Brief for the Respondents at viii-xii, Atlas Roofing Co. "· 
Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S. 422 (1977). 
8o See note 79 supra. 
81 See text accompanying notes 21-31 supra. 
82 See text accompanying notes 78-79 supra. 
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III. POST-ATLAS HISTORICAL-PURPOSIVE ANALYSIS OF THE 
SEVENTH AMENDMENT 
As noted at the outset, 83 the Supreme Court's decision in 
Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore84 arguably offers an analysis more 
satisfactory than that offered by the Atlas Court. In Shore, plaintiff 
instituted a federal class action on behalf of minority shareholders 
against Parklane Hosiery Co. and several of its officers, directors 
and controlling shareholders. 85 Plaintiff alleged essentially that de-
fendants made misleading statements in a proxy statement by fail-
ing to disclose material facts about a proposed merger. 86 Seeking 
recision of the merger and money damages, plaintiff claimed that 
the failure to disclose violated87 sections lO(b), 13(a), 14(a), and 
20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.88 
During the pendency of the class action, the Securities Ex-
change Commission (SEC) brought suit in the federal district court 
against Parklane and its president, both of whom were defendants 
in the class action. 89 The SEC alleged facts concerning the proxy 
statement that were basically identical to those in the class ac-
tion. 90 Seeking an injunction and other equitable relief, the SEC 
alleged violations of the Securities Act of 193391 and the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934.92 
The district court decided the SEC's action for equitable re-
lief, finding that the proxy statement was misleading in failing to 
disclose material facts. The court imposed liability under section 
14(a), but limited the relief to requiring Parklane to amend its er-
roneous filings with the SEC. 93 The Second Circuit affirmed this 
disposition. 94 
Thereafter, plaintiff in the class action moved for summary 
judgment against the defendants named in the SEC suit, arguing 
83 See text accompanying notes 1-10 supra. 
84 99 S. Ct. 644 (1979). 
85 See 565 F.2d 815, 816 (2d Cir. 1977), aff'd, 99 S. Ct. 644 (1979). 
8 6 See id. at 816-17. 
87 See id. 
88 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), 78m(a), 78n(a), 78t(a) (1976). 
89 See 565 F.2d at 817. 
90 See id. 
91 Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1976). 
92 Sections 10(b), 13(a) and 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 
U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), 78m(a), 78n(a) (1976). 
93 SEC v. Parklane Hosiery Co., 422 F. Supp. 477, 486-87 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd, 
558 F.2d 1083 (2d Cir. 1977), aff' d, 99 S. Ct. 644 (1979). 
94 558 F.2d 1083 (2d Cir. 1977), aff' d, 99 S. Ct. 644 (1979). 
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that the doctrine of collateral estoppel barred the defendants from 
relitigating the facts determined in the SEC enforcement proceed-
ing. The district court rejected this argument, apparently per-
suaded by the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
in Rachal v. Hill, 95 which required a jury trial under 
circumstances similar to those in Shore. The Shore order per-
mitting a jury trial was certified to the Second Circuit, and that 
court reversed. 96 
Rachal held that the seventh amendment required a jury trial 
of the issues raised in a private damage suit under the securities 
laws although the same issues had been determined adversely to a 
defendant in an earlier SEC injunction action. 97 The Fifth Circuit 
reasoned that Supreme Court precedent demonstrated great defer-
ence to the demand for a jury trial. 98 In particular, the Supreme 
Court has required that in a suit in which both legal and equitable 
claims appear, the legal claim is to be tried first to a jury to avoid 
jeopardizing the valued "right" to a jury trial. 99 Persuaded by this 
requirement, the Rachal court would not allow the offensive use of 
collateral estoppel to defeat the jury trial right. 
The Second Circuit in Shore rejected the analysis offered in 
Rachal. The court disagreed that the precedent provided by the 
Supreme Court indicated the unconstitutionality of the use of col-
95 435 F.2d 59 (5th Cir. 1970). In denying the summary judgment motion, the 
district court merely cited the Rachal case. See 565 F.2d at 818. 
96 565 F.2d at 818. 
97 435 F.2d at 60-61. 
98 Id. at 63-64. See, e.g., Beacon Theatres v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 509 (1959) 
("only under the most imperative circumstances, circumstances which in view of the 
flexible procedures of the Federal Rules we cannot anticipate, can the right to a jury 
trial of legal issues be lost through prior determination of equitable claims"); Dairy 
Queen v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 473 (1962) (where both legal and equitable issues are 
presented in a single case, "any legal issues for which a jury trial is timely and prop-
erly demanded [must] be submitted to a jury"). In addition to the seventh amend-
ment question, the Rachal court also noted its doubt as to whether collateral estop-
pel could appropriately be applied in light of a lack of mutuality and considerations 
of fairness. 435 F.2d at 63. The court, however, found it unnecessary to rely on this 
ground. Id. For a discussion of the importance of a lack of mutuality to the seventh 
amendment argument in Shore, see notes 106-17 and accompanying text infra. 
99 In Beacon Theatres v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959), plaintiff sought 
injunctive and declaratory relief in connection with a threatened antitrust action. De-
fendant interposed a counterclaim seeking treble damages for alleged antitrust viola-
tions. The lower court had rejected a request for a jury trial on the legal claim since 
it had been joined with the equitable claim. The Supreme Court, however, refused 
to allow the equitable claim to take priority over the legal claim and insisted upon 
the right to a jury trial. 
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lateral estoppel in the circumstances presented. 100 Rather, the Sec-
ond Circuit determined that the Supreme Court in fact implicitly 
recognized that collateral estoppel was available to bar a legal claim 
after a determination on an equitable claim. 101 The Second Circuit 
reasoned that had the Supreme Court not made this assumption, 
then in a suit in which the claims were joined, the order of trying 
the claims would have been of no moment. An earlier nonjury fact 
determination would have presented no danger of obliterating the 
jury trial right "since the defendant would ... have been guaran-
teed a jury trial of the [legal claim] regardless of the outcome of 
the equitable claim. "102 The Shore court then concluded that when 
an equitable claim has been fully and fairly litigated in an earlier 
suit and facts have been determined against a defendant there, col-
lateral estoppel may be invoked to bar a later legal claim without 
offending the seventh amendment, 103 notwithstanding that the 
later claim is brought by a different party. 
In considering the availability of collateral estoppel, the Fifth 
Circuit applied the seventh amendment right to a jury trial liter-
ally, while the Second Circuit rested its contrary result on a plausi-
ble interpretation of earlier Supreme Court cases. 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari104 to resolve the con-
flict between the Second and Fifth Circuits. 105 As in the circuit 
courts, the issue was not whether a prior equitable suit could be 
given collateral estoppel effect in a later common law suit when the 
parties in each were the same;106 an application of collateral estop-
pel where there was mutuality of parties apparently was recognized 
prior to the framing of the seventh amendment and thus was be-
yond the scope of its guarantee. 107 The issue before the Supreme 
Court was, rather, whether the seventh amendment was compati-
ble with the use of collateral estoppel to benefit a plaintiff who was 
not a party to the prior equitable proceeding. Such an application 
100 The Second Circuit reviewed the cases upon which the Fifth Circuit relied, 
e.g., Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962); Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. 
Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959). 
101 565 F.2d at 820. 
102 I d. at 820-21 (emphasis and brackets added). 
103 I d. at 821. 
104 435 u.s. 1006 (1978). 
1°5 See 99 S. Ct. at 648 & n.3. 
106 Rachal and Shore each involved a private plaintiff's attempt in a suit nt com· 
mon law, to have the benefit of facts found in an earlier equitable proceeding 
brought by an administrative agency. See 435 F.2d at 60-61; 565 F.2d at 817·18. 
107 See 99 S. Ct. at 653-54. 
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of collateral estoppel, free of the requirement of mutuality, was un-
known in 1791,108 and therefore arguably violative of the seventh 
amendment. 
In deciding the issue in favor of preclusion, the Shore majority 
found "no persuasive reason . . . why the meaning of the Seventh 
Amendment should depend on whether or not mutuality of parties 
is present. , 109 The Court characterized collateral estoppel as a 
"procedural device[ ]"110 and analogized to such other devices as 
directed verdict and summary judgment, the use of which had 
been held consistent with the seventh amendment111 notwith-
standing that they had been developed after its adoption. 112 Al-
though the Shore majority undertook no extensive independent 
historical analysis of the seventh amendment, 113 the Court relied 
in particular on one case that addressed the historical arguments 
concerning the relationship of the seventh amendment to the use 
of a directed verdict. 114 In Galloway v. United States, 115 the ma-
jority analyzed the historical materials and determined that "[t]he 
[Seventh] Amendment did not bind the federal courts to the exact 
procedural incidents or details of jury trial according to the com-
mon law in 1791, any more than it tied them to the common-law 
system of pleading or the specific rules of evidence then prevail-
ing.,116 Applying the Galloway rationale, the Shore majority 
deemed it immaterial that mutuality was necessary in 1791 and 
concluded that the seventh amendment posed no bar to the appli-
cation of collateral estoppel.117 
1os See id. at 653, 655. 
109 Id. at 654. 
110 Id. 
111 Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 388-93 (1943) (directed verdict); 
Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. United States, 187 U.S. 315, 319-21 {1902) (summary judg-
ment). See also Gasoline Prods. Co. v. Champlin Refining Co., 283 U.S. 494 {1931) 
(retrial on damage issue alone). 
112 99 S. Ct. at 654. Justice Rehnquist, dissenting, argued that the devices relied 
on by the majority in fact did have counterparts at common law and thus, their use 
could be justified on that basis. I d. at 660-61. 
113 Adopting a rationale similar to that of the Second Circuit, sec text accompa-
nying notes 100-103 supra, the Supreme Court noted that the notion "that an equita-
ble determination could have collateral estoppel effect in a subsequent legal action 
was the major premise" of the Court's holding in Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 
359 U.S. 500 (1959). 99 S. Ct. at 653. 
114 99 S. Ct. at 654. 
115 319 u.s. 372 (1942). 
116 Id. at 390. 
117 The Shore Court stated: 
The law of collateral estoppel, like the law in other procedural areas 
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It might be argued that in at least relying on a case wherein a 
historical analysis was undertaken, the Supreme Court in Shore 
discharged its institutional responsibility to provide the historical 
basis for the result that otherwise makes sense only in terms of effi-
ciency and fairness. Justice Rehnquist' s dissent, 118 based on his 
reading of the seventh amendment in its historical context, also, 
seems to offer precisely the required analytical foundation. As-
serting that "[t]he right to trial by jury in civil cases at common 
law is fundamental to our history and jurisprudence," Justice 
Rehnquist argued that the majority had "reduced this valued right 
. . . to a mere 'neutral' factor. "119 In his view, the application of 
the seventh amendment, "perhaps more than with any other provi-
sion of the Constitution, [is] determined by reference to the histor-
ical setting in which the Amendment was adopted. "120 
Noting the Court's statement in Galloway, Justice Rehnquist 
recognized that the seventh amendment is meant to preserve "not 
the incidental or collateral effects of common law practice in 1791" 
but the substance of the jury trial right. 121 He rejected the notion, 
however, that this view of the amendment's reach would permit a 
drastic incursion into the role of the jury simply by implementing 
"any nominally 'procedural change.' "122 Since, in his view, a sub-
stantial alteration in the jury's province easily could be termed 
"procedural reform," any other position essentially would permit 
"judicial repeal" of the seventh amendment. 123 Justice Rehnquist 
forcefully argued that in view of the constitutional underpinnings of 
the jury trial right, an "invasion" of the jury's function, beyond that 
recognized in 1791, could not be justified by mere invocation of 
considerations of judicial economy or accuracy. 124 
defining the scope of the jury's function, has evolved since 1791. Under tht• 
rationale of the Galloway case, these developments are not repugnant to the 
Seventh Amendment simply for the reason that they did not exist in 1791. 
99 S. Ct. at 654. 
118 I d. at 655-64. 
119 I d. at 655. 
120 I d. at 656. 
121 Id. at 659. 
122 I d. 
123 I d. 
124 I d. Justice Rehnquist argued further that, even assuming no seventh amend· 
ment violation, offensive use of collateral estoppel ought not to be permitted "wlww 
the party who is sought to be estopped has not had an opportunity to haw the fal'ts 
of his case determined by a jury." Id. at 661-62. He discussed and rejel'ted tlw pru· 
dential considerations with respect to efficiency that would be paramount In 
deciding whether to apply collateral estoppel to the facts in Shore. Citing the "strung 
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Justice Rehnquist's vigorous Shore dissent suggests that he 
takes seriously seventh amendment rights and reflects agreement 
with the analytical approach presented in Section II above. There 
does appear, however, to be an inconsistency between the thrust 
of his attack on the Shore majority and his belief in the continued 
validity of the Atlas decision, in which he took part. 125 Citing Atlas 
and jones & Laughlin, 126 Justice Rehnquist reaffirmed that Con-
gress could "commit enforcement of statutorily created rights to 
an ·administrative process or specialized court,' "127 notwith-
standing that in Shore he could "see no 'imperative circumstance' 
requiring this wholesale abrogation of jury trials. "128 
Justice Rehnquist's citation of Atlas and jones & uwghlin is in 
conflict with his earlier statement that 
to sanction creation of procedural devices which limit the prO\'• 
ince of the jury to a greater degree than permitted at common 
law in 1791 is in direct contravention of the Seventh Amend-
ment. And since we deal here not with the common law qua 
common law but \vith the Constitution, no amount of argument 
that the device provides for more efficiency or more accuracy or 
is fairer \viii save it if the degree of invasion of the jury's prO\'· 
ince is greater than allowed in 1791. To rule otherwise would ef-
fectively permit judicial repeal of the Seventh Amendment be-
cause nearly any change in the province of the jury, no matter 
how drastic the diminution of its function, can always be denom-
inated "procedural reform. "129 
Justice Rehnquist's position would seem to be that it is un-
acceptable for the sake of procedural efficiency to permit the abro-
gation of the jury trial right. Yet, is not agency adjudication of 
disputes that were formerly actions at common law simply a more 
dramatic instance of a "procedural device," serving to eliminate the 
federal policy favoring jury trials," id. at 662 (citing Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. 
Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959); Jacobs v. New York, 315 U.S. 752, 752-53 (1942)), 
Justice Rehnquist could discern no "unmanageable problems that have resulted" 
from their use. I d. 
125 I d. at 662 n.21. The Atlas decision was unanimous; Justice Blackmun did not 
participate. 
12s Id. 
127 Id. (quoting Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 195 (1974)). 
128 I d. at 662. Justice Rehnquist also remarked, "The founders of our Nation <:on· 
sidered the right of trial by jury in civil cases an important-bulwark against tyr.tnny 
and corruption, a safeguard too precious to be left to the whim of tlu.• SO\'l'reign, or, it 
might be added, to that of the judiciary." I d. at 657. 
129 99 S. Ct. at 659. 
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"province of the jury" in a class of cases wherein a jury trial would 
have been available in 1791? Justice Rehnquist seems to suggest 
that any compromise based upon considerations of efficiency would 
admit of no logical stopping point. 130 As a result, it remains a mys-
tery why Justice Rehnquist was willing to make this compromise in 
the Atlas case, where he participated in the Court's partial, but 
significant repeal of the seventh amendment. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Although the Shore majority and dissent evince somewhat 
more respect for textual-historical inquiry than did the unanimous 
Atlas Court, neither opinion gives any indication that the Atlas 
case, in its far-reaching impact, will be reexamined employing the 
proper historical base. That case, however, must be reexamined; if 
we are committed to the seventh amendment guarantee, then the 
Court must justify with a considered textual analysis a decision that 
sanctions not merely changes in procedure but arguably large-scale 
destruction by Congress of the right to trial by jury. 
130 See text accompanying note 123 supra. 
